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EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE REVIVED?:
SECRECY AND CONFLICT DURING THE BUSH
PRESIDENCY
MARK J. ROZELL†
INTRODUCTION
Although well established now as a legitimate presidential
power, executive privilege remains controversial. Executive privilege
is controversial in part because some presidents have overreached in
exercising this authority. Presidential attempts to conceal evidence of
wrongdoing during the Watergate scandal that led to President Rich-
ard Nixon’s resignation and during the scandal that led to President
Bill Clinton’s impeachment gave executive privilege a bad name.
The phrase “executive privilege” does not appear in the Consti-
tution. To be precise, that phrase was not a part of the common lan-
guage until President Eisenhower’s administration, leading some to
suggest that executive privilege therefore cannot be constitutional.1
These semantic, textualist challenges to executive privilege’s constitu-
tionality fail when viewed through a broader, historical lens of past
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1. See RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 1–2 (1974)
(arguing that executive privilege is unconstitutional and a “myth” because the “very words ‘ex-
ecutive privilege’ were conjoined only yesterday, in 1958”); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A
Critical Comment on the Constitutionality of Executive Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1143, 1146
(1999) (asserting that the existence of executive privilege is not supported by the Constitution,
because it is neither explicitly nor implicitly mentioned in the text).
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interbranch disputes. In fact, every president since George Washing-
ton has exercised some form of what is today called executive privi-
lege, regardless of the words used to describe their actions.2 As Louis
Fisher has pointed out, “[o]ne could play similar word games with
‘impoundment,’ also of recent vintage, but only by ignoring the fact
that, under different names, Presidents have from an early date de-
clined to spend funds appropriated by Congress.”3
Executive privilege is an implied power derived from Article II.4
It is most easily defined as the right of the president and high-level
executive branch officers to withhold information from those who
have compulsory power—Congress and the courts (and therefore, ul-
timately, the public). This right is not absolute, as executive privilege
is often subject to the compulsory powers of the other branches. The
modern understanding of executive privilege has evolved over a long
period as the result of presidential actions, official administration
policies, and court decisions. Today, executive privilege is considered
most legitimate when used to protect, first, certain national security
needs, and second, the confidentiality of White House deliberations
when it is in the public interest to do so. Related to the second, execu-
tive privilege may be appropriate in circumstances where confidenti-
ality is necessary to protect ongoing executive branch investigations.
2. Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In Nixon’s Shadow, 83
MINN. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (1999).
3. Louis Fisher, Raoul Berger on Public Law, 8 POL. SCI. REV. 173, 181 (1978) (reviewing
RAUOL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969)).
4. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (“Whatever the nature of the
privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in the exercise of Art. II powers, the
privilege can be said to derive from the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area
of constitutional duties.”). The key members of the Committee of Style at the Constitutional
Convention—Alexander Hamilton, Rufus King, and Governeur Morris—shaped the language
of Article II to allow the executive to exercise vast powers. The Vesting Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 1, the lack of any enumeration of duties in the Commander in Chief Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, and the many silences about such powers as war, diplomacy, and control over
executive departments all left the president with a vast reserve of unspecified authority. Several
selections from the Federalist Papers support the exercise of executive branch secrecy. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 392–93 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that “[i]t seldom
happens in the negotiation of treaties . . . but that perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch are
sometimes requisite,” and asserting that “[t]he convention [sic] have done well, therefore, in so
disposing of the power of making treaties that although the President must, in forming them, act
by the advice and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of intelli-
gence in such manner as prudence may suggest”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 424 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch”
are valuable characteristics for an executive to have).
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After the Watergate scandal, several presidents exercised execu-
tive privilege either very cautiously or ineffectively. Not until the
Clinton administration did a post-Watergate president make a con-
certed effort to exercise this presidential power.5 Yet, most of Presi-
dent Clinton’s uses of executive privilege were indefensible because
he asserted this power in circumstances that were far beyond widely
accepted norms. In the early stages of his administration, President
George W. Bush has already made substantial use of executive privi-
lege in circumstances where the exercise of that power is highly de-
batable.
This Essay focuses on the various uses of executive privilege
during the early stage of President George W. Bush’s administration.
President Bush has exercised the privilege in an attempt to reestablish
what he perceives as a more correct balance of powers between the
legislative and executive branches. Still, because President Bush has
departed from recognized executive privilege norms, he has ulti-
mately weakened executive privilege.
I.  BACKGROUND
The most important modern articulation of executive privilege
standards was the Reagan administration’s executive privilege memo-
randum.6 On November 4, 1982, President Ronald Reagan issued an
executive privilege memorandum to heads of executive departments
and agencies. The Reagan procedures were generally similar to those
in a 1969 Nixon executive privilege memorandum.7 For example,
President Reagan’s guidelines affirmed the administration policy “to
comply with Congressional requests for information to the fullest ex-
tent consistent with the constitutional and statutory obligations of the
Executive Branch.”8 The memorandum reaffirmed the need for “con-
fidentiality of some communications,”9 and added that executive
privilege would be used “only in the most compelling circumstances,
and only after careful review demonstrate[d] that assertion of the
5. Rozell, supra note 2, at 1071–72.
6. Memorandum from Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, to the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies (Nov. 4, 1982) (on file the with the Duke Law Journal).
7. For a general discussion of President Nixon’s policy on executive privilege in general
and on the 1969 memorandum in particular, see MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:
THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 63-66 (1994).
8. Memorandum from Ronald Reagan, supra note 6, at 1.
9. Id.
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privilege [was] necessary.”10 Finally, the memorandum stated that
“executive privilege [would] not be invoked without specific Presi-
dential authorization.”11
The Reagan memorandum nonetheless developed clearer proce-
dures than had existed before. All congressional requests for informa-
tion would be accommodated unless “compliance raise[d] a substan-
tial question of executive privilege.”12 Such a question would arise if
the information “might significantly impair the national security (in-
cluding the conduct of foreign relations), the deliberative processes of
the Executive Branch or other aspects of the performance of the Ex-
ecutive Branch’s constitutional duties.”13 Under these procedures, if a
department head believed that a congressional request for informa-
tion might concern privileged information, he would notify and con-
sult with both the attorney general and the counsel to the president.
Those three individuals would then decide to release the information
to Congress, or have the matter submitted to the president for a deci-
sion if any one of them believed that it was necessary to invoke ex-
ecutive privilege. At that point, the department head would ask Con-
gress to await a presidential decision. If the president chose executive
privilege, he would instruct the department head to inform Congress
“that the claim of executive privilege [was] being made with the spe-
cific approval of the President.”14 The Reagan memorandum allowed
for the use of executive privilege even if the information originated
from staff levels far removed from the Oval Office.
The George H. W. Bush administration did not adopt any new
formal executive privilege procedures.
In 1994, the Clinton administration issued a memorandum that
defined new procedures for handling executive privilege disputes.15
The Clinton administration adopted the very broad view that all
White House communications are presumptively privileged.16 Fur-
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1–2.
14. Id. at 2.
15. Memorandum from Lloyd N. Cutler, Special Counsel to the President, to All Executive
Department and Agency General Counsels (Sept. 28, 1994) (on file with the Duke Law Jour-
nal).
16. See id. at 1 (“In circumstances involving communications relating to investigations of
personal wrongdoing by government officials, it is our practice not to assert executive privilege,
either in judicial proceedings or in congressional investigations and hearings.”).
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thermore, the administration’s position was that Congress has a less
valid claim to executive branch information when conducting over-
sight than when conducting legislation.17
II.  GEORGE W. BUSH’S EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
In the early stages of the Bush presidency, the administration
was involved in three policy disputes that either had implications for
the development of executive privilege or had a direct claim of privi-
lege by the president. It became clear early in President Bush’s term
that the president was committed to regaining lost ground on execu-
tive privilege. President Bush wanted to both revitalize executive
privilege and expand the scope of that power substantially. President
Bush’s actions appear motivated by his belief in the sovereignty of the
executive branch.
Nonetheless, President Bush chose some very nontraditional
cases for reestablishing executive privilege. In one case, he tried to
expand the scope of executive privilege for former presidents, and
even to allow them to transfer this constitutional authority under Ar-
ticle II to designated representatives. In another case, the Bush ad-
ministration tried to expand executive privilege to protect Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) documents from investigations long ago
closed. To date, the common thread in the Bush administration cases
is the use of executive privilege in circumstances where there is little
precedent for such action. In so doing, President Bush has contrib-
uted to the further downgrading of executive privilege rather than
achieving his purpose of reaffirming this constitutional principle.
A. The Presidential Records Act of 1978 and Executive Order 13223
In 1978, Congress passed the Presidential Records Act18 to estab-
17. See Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to William
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States 3 (Sept. 20, 1996) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (“[I]t is clear that Congressional needs for information [in the context of oversight of
the Administration’s position towards human rights abuses in Haiti] will weigh substantially less
in the constitutional balancing than a specific need in connection with the consideration of leg-
islation.”); Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to William
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States 2 (Sept. 30, 1996) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (asserting that Congress’s “generalized interest” in the oversight of counter-narcotics
policy “weighs substantially less in the constitutional balancing than a specific need in connec-
tion with the consideration of legislation”).
18. Presidential Records Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–591, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 2523, 2523–27
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2207 (2000)).
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lish procedures for the public release of the papers of presidential
administrations. The Act allowed for the public release of presidential
papers twelve years after a president had left office. The principle be-
hind the law was that these presidential records ultimately belong to
the public and should be made available for inspection within a rea-
sonable period of time. Section 2206 of the Act gave responsibility for
implementing this principle to the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA).19 The 1978 Act retained the public disclo-
sure exemptions of the Freedom of Information Act so that certain
materials involving national security or state secrets could be with-
held from public view for longer than the twelve-year period.20
On January 18, 1989, President Reagan issued Executive Order
12267,21 which expanded certain implementation regulations of
NARA. President Reagan’s executive order identified three situa-
tions in which records could be withheld: national security, law en-
forcement, and the deliberative process privilege of the executive
branch.22 The executive order gave a sitting president primary
authority to assert privilege over the records of a former president.23
Furthermore, although Executive Order 12267 recognized that a for-
mer president has the right to claim executive privilege over his ad-
ministration’s papers, the archivist of the United States did not have
to abide by his claim. The incumbent president could override the ar-
chivist with a claim of executive privilege, but only during a thirty-day
review period.24 After that period, absent a formal claim of executive
privilege, the documents were to be automatically released.
On November 1, 2001, President George W. Bush issued Execu-
tive Order 1323325 to supercede President Reagan’s executive order
and to vastly expand the scope of privileges available to current and
former presidents. President Bush’s executive order dropped the law
enforcement category and added two others: the presidential com-
munications privilege and the attorney-client or attorney work prod-
uct privileges. Under the new executive order, former presidents may
assert executive privilege over their own papers, even if the incum-
19. 44 U.S.C. § 2206 (2000).
20. Id. § 2204(c)(1).
21. Exec. Order No. 12,667, 3 C.F.R. 208 (1989), reprinted in 44 U.S.C. § 2204 (2000).  
22. Id. § 1(g), 3 C.F.R. at 208.
23. Id. § 3, 3 C.F.R. at 209.
24. Id. § 4(b), 3 C.F.R. at 210.
25. Exec. Order No. 13,233, 3 C.F.R. 815 (2001), reprinted in 44 U.S.C.A. § 2204 (Supp.
2002).
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bent president disagrees.26 Indeed, President Bush’s executive order
also gives a sitting president the power to assert executive privilege
over a past administration’s papers, even if the former president dis-
agrees.27 President Bush’s standard therefore allows any claim of
privilege over old documents by an incumbent or past president to
stand.28 Furthermore, the Bush executive order requires anyone
seeking to overcome constitutionally based privileges to have a
“demonstrated, specific need” for presidential records.29 The Presi-
dential Records Act of 1978 did not contain such a high obstacle for
those seeking access to presidential documents to overcome. Thus,
under the Bush executive order, the presumption is always in favor of
secrecy, whereas previously, the general presumption was in favor of
openness.
The Bush executive order set off challenges by public advocacy
groups, academic professional organizations, press groups, and some
members of Congress. All were concerned that the executive order
vastly expanded the scope of governmental secrecy in a way that was
damaging to democratic institutions. Several groups, including the
American Historical Association, the Organization of American His-
torians, and Public Citizen, initiated a lawsuit to have the executive
order overturned. Congress held hearings that were highly critical of
the executive order.30 Although the controversy remains unresolved
in 2002, it is clear that President Bush’s executive order improperly
supercedes an Act of Congress and attempts to expand executive
privilege far beyond the traditional standards for the exercise of that
power.
26. Id. § 3(d)(1)(ii), 3 C.F.R. at 817.
27. Id. § 3(d)(2)(ii), 3 C.F.R. at 817.
28. See Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Steve Horn, United
States House of Representatives 1 (Nov. 2, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (ex-
plaining that former presidents “are to have the primary responsibility for asserting privileges
over the records of a former President” but that the sitting president may assert such privileges
in “compelling circumstances” even against the wishes of a former president); Exec. Order No.
13,233 § 3(d), 3 C.F.R. at 817.
29. Exec. Order No. 13,233 § 2(c), 3 C.F.R. at 816 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 713 (1977)).
30. See, e.g., Hearings Regarding Executive Order 13,233 and the Presidential Records Act
Before the House Subcomm. on Gov’t Efficiency, Fin. Mgmt. & Intergovernmental Relations and
the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 107th Cong. 30 (2001) [hereinafter Hearings Regarding Ex-
ecutive Order 13,233] (statement of Professor Anna K. Nelson, American University) (“[T]he
Bush Administration, unwittingly perhaps, has thwarted the intention of Congress to open these
government records to the public.”).
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Thus, the groups opposed to the president’s action were correct
for the following reasons. First, the handling of presidential papers is
a matter that should be handled by statute and not by executive or-
der. Presidential papers are ultimately public documents—a part of
our national records—and are paid for with public funds. They should
not be treated merely as private papers.
Second, although there is legal precedent for allowing an ex-
president to assert executive privilege,31 the standard for allowing
such a claim is very high, and executive privilege cannot stand merely
because an ex-president has some personal or political interest in pre-
serving secrecy.32 An ex-president’s interest in maintaining confiden-
tiality erodes substantially once he leaves office, and it continues to
erode even further over time.33 The Bush executive order does not
acknowledge any such limitation on a former president’s interest in
confidentiality.
Third, the executive order makes it easy for such claims by for-
mer presidents to stand, and almost impossible for those challenging
the claims to get information in a timely way. The legal constraints
will effectively delay requests for information for years as these mat-
ters are fought out in the courts. These obstacles alone will settle the
issue in favor of former presidents, because many with an interest in
access to information will conclude that they do not have the ability
or the resources to stake a viable challenge. The burden will shift
from those who must justify withholding information to fall instead
on those who have made a claim for access to information.
Fourth, executive privilege may actually be frivolous in this case
because there are already other secrecy protections in place for na-
tional security purposes. In a nutshell, the Bush administration is try-
ing to expand executive privilege substantially to cover what existing
statutes and regulations already cover. Furthermore, a general inter-
est in confidentiality is not enough to sustain a claim of executive
31. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 449 (1976) (adopting the solicitor gen-
eral’s view that some constitutionally based privileges “survive[] the individual President’s ten-
ure”).
32. See id. at 439 (“We reject the argument that only an incumbent President may assert
[the presidential privilege of confidentiality] and hold that appellant, as a former President, may
also be heard to assert [it].”).
33. Id. at 451.
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privilege over old documents that may go back as far as twenty
years.34
B. Cheney Energy Task Force
President Bush appointed Vice President Richard Cheney to di-
rect an energy policy task force for the purpose of developing the
administration’s energy policy. In April 2001, two Democratic mem-
bers of Congress, Henry Waxman and John Dingell, requested infor-
mation from Vice President Cheney about the composition and ac-
tivities of the task force. Their request was in response to press
reports that the task force had been meeting in secrecy with represen-
tatives of various groups that had a direct interest in the development
of a national energy policy. The lawmakers asked the General Ac-
counting Office (GAO) to investigate the activities of the task force.
The GAO initially responded with a broad-based request for infor-
mation about the task force meetings. The GAO also requested in-
formation regarding the identities of individuals present at task force
meetings, the identities of persons consulted by the task force about
the development of energy policy, and the costs of the meetings. The
vice president’s counsel mostly refused this request and provided only
a limited number of documents that the GAO considered unhelpful.
After several months of wrangling over access to the information, on
August 2, 2001, the vice president wrote to Congress that the GAO
lacked authority to seek access to the task force information. Ac-
cording to Vice President Cheney, the GAO only has the authority to
review the results of programs, and not to seek information from a
task force involved in program development.
Comptroller General of the United States David Walker strongly
objected to the assertion that the GAO’s scope of authority is limited
to reviewing program results. Nonetheless, the GAO narrowed the
scope of its information request and decided to seek only the names
of advisers to the task force, the dates, locations and the subjects of
meetings. The GAO and the members of Congress had thus dropped
34. E.g., Hearings Regarding Executive Order 13,233, supra note 30, at 52 (statement of
Professor Mark J. Rozell, The Catholic University of America); see also Hearings on “H.R.
4187, the Presidential Records Act Amendments of 2002” Before the House Subcomm. on Gov’t
Efficiency, Fin. Mgmt. & Intergovernmental Relations, 107th Cong. 1 (2002) (statement of Mark
J. Rozell) (concluding that “it is well within congressional authority . . . to define the process for
claiming and resolving executive privilege claims that arise from requests for the papers of past
administrations”).
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their insistence that Vice President Cheney disclose substantive de-
tails about discussions that took place in those meetings.
The conflict between the GAO and the vice president’s office
appeared headed to a court showdown until the terrorist attacks on
the United States on September 11, 2001. Walker issued a statement
in late September that the dispute remained unresolved, but that
“given our current national focus on combating terrorism and en-
hancing homeland security, this matter is not a current priority.”35 On
January 27, 2002, Vice President Cheney declared that the admini-
stration was steadfast in its refusal to provide even the most basic in-
formation about the meetings because of an important principle in-
volved: that to do so would contribute to a further withering away of
traditional presidential prerogatives. The conservative group Judicial
Watch filed a lawsuit against the Cheney task force to try to compel
public disclosure of information about the names of persons who had
met with the task force.36 The liberal National Resources Defense
Council also initiated a lawsuit to get access to administration infor-
mation on the development of energy policy.37 On January 30, 2002,
the GAO announced its intention to initiate a lawsuit to force Vice
President Cheney to reveal the names of the participants in the task
force meetings and to give other details about the meetings.38
At this writing, this controversy has not resulted in a direct presi-
dential claim of privilege. Nonetheless, in his August 2 letter to the
Congress, Vice President Cheney asserted that to provide the infor-
mation requested by GAO would interfere with the constitutional du-
ties of the executive branch by undermining the confidentiality of in-
ternal deliberations. Walker correctly pointed out that Vice President
Cheney had thereby introduced “the same language and reasoning as
assertions of Executive Privilege.”39 Walker also noted that the GAO
had merely requested factual information, such as the names of per-
35. Press Release, David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, U.S. Gen-
eral Accounting Office, Statement on the National Energy Policy Development Group (Sept.
28, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
36. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C.
2002).
37. Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. Dep’t of Energy, 191 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2002).
38. The GAO later did file a suit. See Walker v. Cheney, No. 02-0340 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 22,
2002).
39. Letter from David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, U.S. General
Accounting Office, to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives 4 (Aug. 17,
2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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sons who attended meetings and the costs of meetings, and not delib-
erative information.40
Because of this narrow scope of inquiry, any claim of executive
privilege in this controversy, whether made explicitly by the president
or implicitly by the vice president, lacked credibility. The vice presi-
dent was on stronger ground in his refusal to cooperate with the ini-
tial request for information about the task force in the summer of
2001 because that inquiry was overly broad. The definition of “rec-
ords” sought initially by GAO went on for half a page,
reaching to e-mails, voicemails, drawings, plans, checks and canceled
checks, bank statements, ledgers, books, diaries, logs, video record-
ings, telexes, notes, invoices, and drafts. Because of that initially
broad information request, it is plausible that Vice President Cheney
perceived the later narrowed request as merely a first effort by the
GAO to ultimately drag him into a multistep process of getting more
and more detailed information over time. Vice President Cheney may
also have been concerned that releasing the names of those who met
with the administration task force would result in those individuals
being called in the future to testify to Congress. Nonetheless, these
concerns are not sufficient to sustain a claim of executive privilege,
because the narrow scope of the GAO request for information does
not involve either direct presidential decisionmaking or even delib-
erative matters. Thus, the administration has pursued a two-pronged
strategy of: (1) making the traditional arguments for executive privi-
lege without making a formal claim of that principle, and (2) claiming
that the GAO lacks statutory authority to access executive branch in-
formation about task force matters.
Whether the administration succeeds in a legal battle with the
GAO depends on a number of factors unknown at this writing. For
example, it is conceivable that a court would rule that Congress has
not exhausted all of its mechanisms for getting the information, in-
cluding holding hearings, issuing subpoenas, and that there is no legal
resolution available unless Congress does so. It is also possible that
Congress indeed will hold direct hearings and issue subpoenas, at
which point the administration may respond differently.
C. Department of Justice Documents and Congressional Oversight
President Bush made his first formal claim of executive privilege
40. Id. at 2.
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on December 12, 2001. This claim was in response to a congressional
subpoena for prosecutorial records from the DOJ. The House Gov-
ernment Reform Committee, chaired by Representative Dan Burton,
was investigating two separate matters that concerned DOJ deci-
sionmaking. First, the committee was examining the decision by for-
mer Attorney General Janet Reno to refuse to appoint an independ-
ent counsel to investigate allegations of campaign finance abuses in
the 1996 Clinton-Gore campaign. Second, the committee was exam-
ining allegations of FBI corruption in its Boston office’s handling of
organized crime in the 1960s and 1970s. The committee made it clear
that it was not requesting DOJ documents or other materials per-
taining to any ongoing criminal investigations.
President Bush instructed Attorney General John Ashcroft not
to comply with the congressional request for any deliberative docu-
ments from the DOJ. Ashcroft clashed with Burton over the admini-
stration’s refusal to cooperate with the legislative investigations. At
the core of this battle was a dispute over whether an administration
can withhold any and all documents that involve prosecutorial mat-
ters, even if those matters are officially closed. Burton and members
of the committee were upset that the Bush administration was trying
to expand the scope of its authority to withhold information from
Congress by refusing documents from terminated DOJ investigations.
They were also upset that the Bush DOJ had declared that the unfin-
ished investigation of the 1996 campaign finance controversy was
closed. Burton and his colleagues clearly believed that Reno had
hampered legitimate investigations, and that President Bush’s desire
to have certain Clinton-era controversies ended had the effect of de-
nying full public disclosure of governmental misconduct. Burton
penned a strongly worded letter to Ashcroft protesting the admini-
stration’s “inflexible adherence to the position” that all deliberative
materials from the DOJ be routinely withheld from Congress.41 Bur-
ton pointed out that the administration had not made a valid claim of
executive privilege and therefore had no right to withhold the docu-
ments requested by his committee.42
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales recommended that the
president assert executive privilege in response to any congressional
41. Letter from Dan Burton, Chairman, House of Representatives Committee on Gov-
ernment Reform, to John Ashcroft, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice 1 (Aug. 29,
2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
42. Id. at 2.
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subpoena for the documents or if Ashcroft appeared before the
committee. The committee subpoenaed the documents and called
Ashcroft to appear at a hearing on September 13, 2001. Because of
the terrorist attacks two days before the scheduled hearing, Ash-
croft’s appearance was delayed. A new hearing was then scheduled
for December 13, 2001. President Bush wrote a memorandum to
Ashcroft asserting executive privilege.43 At the hearing (Ashcroft was
not present), Burton fumed “This is not a monarchy . . . . [t]he legisla-
tive branch has oversight responsibility to make sure there is no cor-
ruption in the executive branch.”44 In place of Ashcroft, the chief of
staff of the DOJ Criminal Division issued the administration’s state-
ment before the committee. The statement claimed that revealing in-
formation about DOJ investigations would have a “chilling effect” on
future DOJ deliberations. Nonetheless, during the hearing, the wit-
ness, Michael Horowitz, admitted that although the administration
had adopted the policy that Congress should never receive access to
deliberative documents, in the future, the DOJ could conduct a case-
by-case analysis of the validity of congressional requests for such
documents.45 This statement indicated for the first time that there was
some flexibility on the administration’s part with regard to the princi-
ple of withholding deliberative materials.
43. Memorandum from George W. Bush, President of the United States, to the Attorney
General 1 (Dec. 12, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
44. See Ellen Nakashima, Bush Invokes Privilege on Hill, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2001, at
A43 (quoting Burton).
45. See 1 Investigation into Allegations of Justice Department Misconduct in New England:
Hearings Before the Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 107th Cong. 382 (2001) [hereinafter Investigation
into Allegations] (statement of Michael E. Horowitz, Chief of Staff, Criminal Division, U.S. De-
partment of Justice) (“[W]e remain willing to work informally with the committee to provide
the information to the committee about the decisions related to these subpoenaed documents
that you had not previously requested . . . .”). This prepared statement is a truly unimpressive
brief on behalf of the administration’s claim of privilege. It contains a string of unconnected
quotations taken out of context to try to prove the obvious point that administrations have se-
crecy needs. The statement never gets beyond broad generalities to make a case why secrecy
was needed in this particular dispute. Some of the evidence presented is simply wrong (e.g., the
claim that George Washington withheld all information from Congress in the St. Clair incident),
leaves out important facts (e.g., that four days after a former Bush administration stand on ex-
ecutive privilege, the president relented and gave everything to Congress), and claims as
authoritative a widely discredited assertion by former attorney general Benjamin Civiletti that
allowing members of Congress to investigate the process of federal prosecutions would destroy
the civil liberties of persons under investigation. BENJAMIN R. CIVILETTI, JUSTICE
UNBALANCED: CONGRESS AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 5–6 (The Heritage Foundation,
Lecture No. 472, 1993).
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President Bush’s executive privilege memorandum to Ashcroft
emphasized the deliberative nature of some of the prosecutorial ma-
terials requested by the committee. The president also expressed con-
cern that releasing materials regarding confidential recommendations
to an attorney general “would inhibit the candor necessary to the ef-
fectiveness of the deliberative processes by which the Department [of
Justice] makes prosecutorial decisions.”46 More vaguely, the president
asserted the separation of powers doctrine and the need “to protect
individual liberty,” and he stated that “congressional access to these
documents would be contrary to the national interest.”47
The DOJ followed with a letter to Burton emphasizing the presi-
dent’s assertion of executive privilege over the subpoenaed docu-
ments and expressing a desire to reach some accommodation. Assis-
tant Attorney General Daniel Bryant expressed the unwillingness of
the DOJ to release certain memoranda pertaining to Reno’s decision
not to appoint a special counsel to investigate allegations of campaign
improprieties in the 1996 Clinton-Gore campaign.48 Regarding the in-
vestigation of allegations of FBI corruption, he expressed at some
length the DOJ’s willingness to “work together” with the committee
to provide “additional information without compromising the princi-
ples maintained by the executive branch.”49 Burton responded that
the offer of accommodation was meaningless because, ultimately, the
administration remained unwilling to allow the committee to review
the most crucial documents for the purposes of an investigation.50
Gonzales followed with the assurance that the administration did not
have a “bright-line policy” of withholding all deliberative documents
from Congress.51 Yet Gonzales continued that, with regard to such
46. Bush, supra note 43, at 1.
47. Id.
48. See Letter from Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative
Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to Dan Burton, Chairman, House of Representatives
Committee on Government Reform 1 (Dec. 19, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(“The Department has a strong confidentiality interest in the extremely sensitive prosecutorial
decisionmaking documents called for by the subpoenas.”).
49. Id. at 2.
50. See Letter from Dan Burton, Chairman, House of Representatives Committee on Gov-
ernment Reform, to John Ashcroft, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice 1–2 (Jan. 3,
2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“[I]f you were prepared to advise the President to
invoke executive privilege over the . . . documents, there is little likelihood that you would ever
permit Congress to receive deliberative memoranda.”).
51. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Dan Burton, Chairman,
House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform 1 (Jan. 10, 2002) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
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memoranda, “the Executive Branch has traditionally protected those
highly sensitive deliberative documents against public or congres-
sional disclosure,”52 a characterization that Burton strongly rejected.53
It is truly puzzling that President Bush took his first official ex-
ecutive privilege stand over materials concerning closed DOJ investi-
gations. The Bush administration had made it clear that it was neces-
sary to regain the lost ground of executive privilege after the years of
Clinton scandals and misuses of that power. Yet it chose to regain
some of that lost ground in a circumstances in which there appeared
little justification for the exercise of that power. There were no na-
tional security implications to the legislative investigation. There was
no clear public interest at stake in protecting old investigative docu-
ments and other materials. This claim of privilege did not even fall
into the category of protecting the integrity of ongoing criminal inves-
tigations.
The dispute over certain DOJ documents became especially
heated when news stories reported that the FBI had abused its
authority when it investigated organized crime in the 1960s and 1970s.
There was credible evidence that the FBI had caused the wrongful
imprisonment of at least one person while it protected a government
witness who committed multiple murders even while he was in pro-
tection. Burton demanded access to ten key DOJ documents in order
to investigate the allegations of wrongful conduct by the FBI.54 The
documents that Burton requested were, on average, twenty-two years
old.55 The administration refused to turn over DOJ documents, and
Burton threatened to take this controversy to the courts.
Burton had the complete support of the committee, as evidenced
by a February 6, 2002, hearing at which all the members, Republican
and Democrat alike, joined in lambasting the administration’s actions,
and declared their intention to carry the fight for the documents as far
52. Id.
53. Id.; Letter from Dan Burton, Chairman, House of Representatives Committee on Gov-
ernment Reform, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President 2 (Jan. 11, 2002) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
54. Letter from Dan Burton, Chairman, House of Representatives Committee on Gov-
ernment Reform, to John Ashcroft, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice 2 (Feb. 4,
2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
55. Id.
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as necessary.56 The complete unanimity of the committee was remark-
able, especially given that the administration—during a period of war
and with extraordinary high levels of public approval—had made di-
rect appeals for support to GOP members of the committee on the
eve of the hearing. At the opening of the hearing, several GOP mem-
bers openly declared their disdain for this tactic, and said that, re-
gardless of party affiliation or of a president’s popularity, they were
ready to defend Congress’s prerogatives.
The administration witness at the hearing, Daniel Bryant, an as-
sistant attorney general in the DOJ Office of Legislative Affairs, as-
serted the position that all prosecutorial documents are “presump-
tively privileged” and never available for congressional inspection.57
This claim ran counter to a long history of congressional access to
DOJ prosecutorial documents, especially in cases of closed investiga-
tions where the need for secrecy has disappeared.58 It also appeared to
run counter to earlier administration policy clarifications that there
was no blanket policy of withholding such materials from Congress.
Bryant stated that the administration was willing to give an oral pres-
entation about the general contents of the disputed documents to
members of the committee, but not to allow the members to actually
see the documents.59 This offer only brought more comments of dis-
dain from committee members.
On March 1, 2002, the two sides reached an accommodation in
which the committee would be permitted to openly view six of the ten
disputed documents. The agreement allowed both sides to declare
victory. The committee claimed that it had won the right to access to
the most important documents that were necessary for its investiga-
tion of the Boston FBI office scandal. The administration took the
56. See 1 Investigation into Allegations, supra note 45, at 471 (statement of Henry A. Wax-
man, Representative in Congress from the State of California) (“This administration’s effort to
operate in secret goes far beyond national security or any other important national interest.”);
Id. at 481–82 (statement of Charles E. Grassley, U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa) (“I fear
that there is a widespread, deliberate policy by agencies to deny or delay giving information to
Congress . . . . Getting to the bottom of the . . . scandal and fixing the cause of this injustice far
outweighs any need to preserve the deliberate process.”).
57. Id. at 505 (statement of Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legis-
lative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice).
58. See id. at 516 (statement of Professor Mark J. Rozell, The Catholic University of
America) (providing three examples in which Congress received access to DOJ deliberative
documents).
59. Id. at 504 (statement of Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legis-
lative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice).
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view that it had allowed access only to a narrow category of docu-
ments—in this case, those that concerned an indicted FBI agent were
considered necessary to Congress’s oversight function. The admini-
stration continued to insist that it did not have to give Congress access
to deliberative documents. Ultimately, the committee accepted this
agreement because of a lack of a consensus that members should in-
stead continue to push for all ten documents. The administration pre-
vailed in withholding three key documents pertaining to Reno’s deci-
sion not to appoint a special counsel to investigate campaign finance
abuses by the 1996 Clinton-Gore campaign. The inability of the
committee to achieve a total victory indeed reflected the unwilling-
ness of certain Democratic members to push for these three docu-
ments.
The resolution of this controversy was somewhat reminiscent of
many former executive privilege battles, especially the ones during
the Reagan years. In each of those battles the administration staked
out a strong stand on executive privilege and signaled a refusal to
compromise; Congress persisted and used its authority to pressure the
administration to turn over the disputed materials; the administration
ultimately relented on either all the documents, or at least the key
ones; both sides walked away and declared victory. In this case
though, the committee achieved only a partial victory. Furthermore,
that the administration held the line on certain categories of docu-
ments signaled the likelihood of additional such information disputes
between the branches during the Bush presidency.
III.  EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN THE EARLY GEORGE W. BUSH
PRESIDENCY SUMMARIZED
Although President Bush wanted to quickly reestablish executive
privilege, he attempted to do so in his first year in office by means of
some very nontraditional cases. One case concerned executive privi-
lege for former presidents and with regard to the papers of past ad-
ministrations. The common standard is that a former president’s in-
terest in maintaining secrecy over his administration’s documents
wanes substantially over time. President Bush’s executive order at-
tempts to override an act of Congress and to vastly expand presiden-
tial privileges for ex-presidents. A second controversy concerned the
exercise of a form of executive privilege by a sitting vice president.
The common standard for years has been that presidents alone have
the authority to either assert executive privilege or to direct an ad-
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ministration official to do so. Even though Vice President Cheney did
not use the words “executive privilege” in refusing access to informa-
tion, he used legal language and justifications identical to an actual
claim of executive privilege. Furthermore, Vice President Cheney did
not assert the right to withhold deliberative materials or presidential
advice but rather very benign seeming factual information such as
names of people present at certain meetings of the task force and the
costs and the subjects of those meetings. The third controversy again
involved protecting materials from closed, not ongoing, criminal in-
vestigations.
None of these cases concerned national security. The administra-
tion never made a convincing case that there was some strong public
interest involved in protecting the release of these materials to Con-
gress. With the nation at war abroad and fighting terrorism domesti-
cally, it is not hard to imagine a stronger circumstance in which the
administration might stake a claim to executive privilege to protect
national security and the public interest. In its first months in office,
the Bush administration instead made some flimsy attempts at re-
storing executive privilege.
President Bush’s efforts on executive privilege nonetheless were
consistent with an overall administration strategy of attempting to tip
the balance of federal governmental powers increasingly in favor of
the executive branch. If the administration sustains strong public sup-
port for the war on terror, then it stands to reason that the president
will continue to try to enhance his ability to exercise greater powers
with fewer congressional restraints. Such a scenario creates the likeli-
hood of future battles with Congress over executive privilege.
CONCLUSION
What is the current standing of executive privilege? The debate
on executive privilege over the past generation has shifted signifi-
cantly. Few any longer call it a “myth.” The principle of executive
privilege is widely accepted today, although there is considerable de-
bate about the parameters of this presidential power. It certainly has
not helped that the George W. Bush administration has overreached
in its exercise of this power.
To clarify the parameters of this power, some advocate the adop-
tion of a statutory definition of executive privilege, and others express
the hope that future court decisions will provide more guidance and
specificity over executive privilege. Yet neither proposed solution is
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necessary or desirable. The resolution to conflicts over executive
privilege resides in the theory of separation of powers as envisioned
by the framers of the Constitution. Congress and the courts possess
the institutional powers needed to challenge presidential exercises of
executive privilege. So long as the other branches vigorously protect
their prerogatives, presidential misuses of executive privilege will be
curtailed. There is no need for a legislatively or judicially imposed
solution to prevent such possible future misuses of executive privilege
when these branches already possess the constitutional powers
needed to successfully challenge presidents.
The early stage of the Bush administration demonstrates that
even during periods of high popularity, presidents are often con-
strained in their efforts to expand or overreach their constitutional
authority. President Bush has revived the national debate over execu-
tive privilege. He shows little interest in backing away from battles
with Congress over this presidential power. It is thus likely that the
debate over executive privilege will continue, as long as Congress still
vigorously challenges presidential assertions of that power.
